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Abstract:
Selective exposure is the tendency to gather viewpoint-congenial vs. -uncongenial information. 
Extant models of selective exposure suggest this tendency occurs because people anticipate 
reading congenial (vs. uncongenial) information will cause more favorable intrapersonal 
consequences. However, these models ignore the notion that people’s information choices are, in 
part, symbolic gestures designed to convey identity-relevant beliefs to an audience through 
information display. Drawing from perspectives that emphasize human consumption as symbolic 
and a way to signal one’s identity, we suggest that selective exposure pertains not only to 
information processing but also to conveying identity through information display. Experiment 1 
showed that people characterize information display as a way to communicate their views to an 
audience. Experiments 2-4 showed that people are averse to displaying uncongenial vs. 
congenial information (without processing the information), anticipate feeling more 
uncomfortable and more inauthentic merely displaying (without processing) uncongenial vs. 
congenial information, and that people’s intentions to engage in selective exposure in daily life 
are a function of their belief that selective-exposure displays convey their identity. None of these 
studies or findings can be generated from extant selective exposure theories. Thus, selective 
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“You Are What You Read1:” 
Is Selective Exposure a Way People Tell Us Who They Are? 
Selective exposure is the tendency to predominantly gather information that supports 
(congenial information) rather than challenges (uncongenial information) one’s views.2 This 
tendency constricts people’s understanding of reality to existing notions and precludes 
opportunities for changing inaccurate views. Given these implications, selective exposure has 
long interested social scientists (Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2010; Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; 
Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015) and philosophers (Bacon, 1602/1960; James, 1890). Despite much 
interest from multiple fields such as marketing, communications, political science, and 
psychology, we believe that extant theories of selective exposure are incomplete (Donsbach & 
Mothes, 2012; Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2010; Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; Knobloch-
Westerwick, 2015; Stroud, 2017). Specifically, extant theories recognize that preferences for 
congenial versus uncongenial information can be driven by beliefs that processing congenial (vs. 
uncongenial) information will confer some intrapsychic benefit (e.g., feeling good, strengthened 
view-points, etc.). However, extant theories fail to recognize that people can also prefer 
congenial (vs. uncongenial) information because they anticipate displaying this information will 
signal identity-relevant information. To highlight the role of display in selective exposure, 
consider two hypothetical scenarios:  
Carl is a devout Catholic. One day while browsing at the local bookstore, he s es a best-
selling book that criticizes Catholicism. He finds the premise intriguing, and he is curious 
why this author would view Catholicism as problematic. He is interested in buying the 
book. But, to do so, he realizes he will need to carry it to the checkout counter and, worse 
still, hand it to a clerk for purchase. He imagines, “People will think I am an atheist!” and 
considers his own insecurities about this categorization. He decides to not purchase this 
                                                            
1 This quote is attributed to Oscar Wilde.  
2 Selective exposure can also be based in people’s greater access to congenial information in their environment. This 
type of selective exposure—called “de facto selective exposure” (Freedman & Sears, 1965)—is not relevant to the 
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book; instead, he finds a book touting Catholicism, which also seems interesting, and 
purchases that book. 
 
Joanne is a staunch liberal, yet she enjoys watching conservative news stations such as 
Fox News. Although she often disagrees with the commentary, she enjoys considering 
alternative views and finds some of the Fox News personalities entertaining. While 
waiting for her doctor’s appointment, the TV in the waiting room is set to CNN (a rather 
liberal news station). She finds the discussion boring. No one in the waiting room seems 
to be paying attention to the TV, so she considers switching it to Fox News. But, she 
holds back, thinking to herself, “I don’t want to come across as the right-wing 
authoritarian ‘type’ that would watch Fox.” She begrudgingly continues watching CNN. 
 
 What do these examples have in common? In each case, a person is not being drawn to 
congenial over uncongenial information based on what s/he wants to process (i.e., read or hear). 
Rather, each person (a) feels that displaying uncongenial vs. congenial information sends a  
inaccurate or suboptimal message about his/her identity and, in turn, each person (b) avoids the 
uncongenial information for congenial information. As we explain, we think there is reason to 
believe that Carl and Joanne’s psychological experience is a plausible cause of selective 
exposure. Yet, modern theorizing on selective exposure fails to account for this psychological 
experience. In our view, this omission constrains a full understanding of why selective exposure 
happens in daily life and prevents the generation of novel ideas on how to describe or combat it.  
 It is useful to consider why Carl’s and Joanne’s psychological experience is likely to 
reflect a general phenomenon. First, information display can be considered a signal of coalitional 
affiliation (e.g., carrying a Bible implies affiliative ties to the Christian faith; Kahan, 2013), and, 
most often, people should be concerned with signaling an accurate affiliation. Accurate signaling 
plays the critical role of advertising the formidability of one’s affiliation (or views) while 
simultaneously repelling rivals (Fessler, Holbrook, & Dashoff, 2015), attracting teammates 
(Kurzban & Neuberg, 2005; Van Vugt & Park, 2010), and ingratiating oneself with ingroup 
members (Cohen, 2003). Second, attitude expression via information display can be considered a 
useful way to cultivate a desired identity (Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980, 
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(e.g., abortion, euthanasia), are often a feature of desired identities (e.g., attitudes can be used to 
appear moral, smart, healthy; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980), people should generally wish to 
express these attitudes accurately (vs. inaccurately) to make a subjectively good impression. In 
sum, for various reasons, people should feel that displaying uncongenial vs. congenial 
information sends a suboptimal message about their affiliations or identity, which can foster 
predominant gathering of congenial information for display. 
 Based on our conceptualization, then, people view information sources (e.g., books, 
magazines, articles, news programs) a  more than objects that can activate thoughts and feelings 
about the sources’ content. People also see information sources as objects that can be displayed 
to convey identity-relevant beliefs to others (e.g., displaying religious texts suggests one is 
religious; Schlenker, 1980). In this sense, information gathering is no different than other forms 
of consumption behavior (e.g., buying clothes). Theories of consumer behavior recognize that 
people’s choices of goods and services are not merely based on intrapsychic functions (e.g., 
people do not buy clothes merely to protect their skin from the elements) but are also based on 
the symbolic identity functions that the entities serve via their display (e.g., clothes can make 
people look sophisticated, sexy, athletic; Elliott & Wattanasuwan, 1998; Mathur, 2013; 
Oyserman & Schwarz, 2017; Shavitt, Torelli, & Wong, 2009). People presumably choose goods 
and services that, through their display, effectively and accurately communicate desired qualities 
of the self, such as one’s cherished values or personality characteristics. This position is hard to 
counter-argue and is consistent with any number of theories in social-personality psychology 
such as self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), symbolic self-completion theory (Wicklund & 
Gollwitzer, 1982), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2012), and impression management 
(Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 2012), which specify that, as social-cultural creatures, people use 
material objects as symbols to externally represent the self. 
 Given this framework, people are likely highly strategic in what information preferences 
they willingly display in public. Indeed, people are likely aware that the information with which 
they associate can project their attitudes, values, and goals to others (e.g., a newspaper 
preference can be a telling indicator of one’s ideology). This idea may hold important 
implications for understanding people’s information choices. For example, when one’s stances 
are controversial and could alienate others, people might generally avoid displaying their 
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But, people might be particularly likely to avoid displaying uncongenial controversial 
information in public because such information also sends the wrong signal about one’s identity 
and affiliations. Indeed, uncongenial information misrepresents the self, so displaying 
uncongenial information has greater potential to evoke negative emotions such as shame and 
embarrassment that signal a spoiled impression (Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980). The fictional 
stories of Carl and Joanne highlight this point. Hence, we extracted two ideas that were of 
interest to us here: First, people might wish to avoid displaying their information choices on 
controversial issues (to avoid seeming partisan and controversial); second, people might be 
particularly likely to avoid displaying uncongenial (versus congenial) information on 
controversial issues because such information can alienate one’s own side (i.e., signal the wrong 
coalitional affiliation) and, more generally, send the wrong message about one’s values.   
 Some work on information gathering supports the possibility that people consider 
information displays’ signaling implications. For example, Earl, Nisson, and Albarracín (2015) 
found that people were less likely to read stigmatizing health information in public than private. 
Presumably, participants were concerned that displaying stigmatizing health information in 
public might suggest to an audience that they had the condition, so they avoided it (see also Earl, 
Crause, Vaid, & Albarracín, 2016). Recently, Adams, Hart, Richardson, Tortoriello, and 
Rentschler (2018) showed that participants who were told that (congenial) selective exposure 
does not indicate people’s commitments subsequently engaged in less (congenial) selective 
exposure than participants who were told that it does indicate people’s commitments. In other 
words, when participants believed that congenial displays were not appropriate symbols for 
expressing attitudes, selective exposure lost its luster. Also, Gabielkov, Ramachandran, 
Chaintreau, and Legout (2016) indicated hat up to 60% of links shared on Twitter were not 
clicked on by the original poster. Thus, people sometimes display information to others without 
reading it, which suggests information gathering may involve considerations beyond merely 
processing ones. Although these studies seemingly support our conception of selective exposure 
as reflecting display considerations, none of these studies directly addressed this issue.    
  In four experiments, we tested the notion that information displays on controversial 
topics likely provoke information avoidance tendencies and selective exposure tendencies. In 
Experiment 1, we first sought evidence that people conceptualize information gathering as a way 
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emotional and cognitive consequences based in merely displaying controversial information in 
public and whether such negative consequences are stronger for uncongenial vs. congenial 
information. Experiment 3 tested whether people’s tendencies to avoid uncongenial vs. congenial 
displays (without processing the information) are commensurate to their tendencies to avoid 
uncongenial vs. congenial processing (without displaying the information). Experiment 4 tested 
whether participants believed that being seen with congenial (vs. uncongenial) information sent a 
more accurate message about their identity to an audience, and whether this belief, in turn, 
related to intentions to engage in selective-exposure bias in daily life. Hence, Experiments 2-4 
separated display considerations from processing considerations (e.g., reading was not at stake 
but display was) to address whether display considerations could uniquely contribute to 
selective-exposure tendencies.      
Experiment 1 
 Central to our theory is that people conceptualize (congenial) selective exposure as a 
form of attitude expression, but we were unaware of any data conclusively showing this. Hence, 
Experiment 1 aimed to confirm this central premise. Specifically, participants believed they were 
participating in a study on people’s ability to communicate and miscommunicate their attitudes 
to others via only their behavior. Participants indicated their view on gun control and were told 
they would engage in various behaviors in the session that may or may not be useful to reveal 
their atitudes to future participants (i.e., “guessers” in a different study). In one within-subjects 
condition, participants were asked to engage in behavior on a task to fake their true views so 
future “guessers” would incorrectly guess their view (fake-attitude condition); in the other 
within-subjects condition, participants were asked to engage in behavior to reveal their true 
attitude (true-attitude condition). In each instruction context, all participants completed an 
information search selecting from amongst pro- and anti-gun control speech titles. If participants 
perceive information gathering as a means to express their attitudes, then, in the true-attitude 
condition, we should find a positive correlation between pro-gun control attitudes and enhanced 
gathering of pro-gun control (vs. anti-gun control) material; in the fake-attitude condition, we 
should find the opposite pattern.         
Method 
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  A sample size of N = 115 is required to detect a small effect size (f2 = .07) in our 
experimental design with power set to .80 and alpha to .05; we anticipated a large effect but 
chose to be conservative in our estimation. One-hundred-sixteen undergraduate students in the 
United States (US) participated for partial fulfillment of course requirements; two participants 
failed to complete the study and were removed from analyses (N = 114; 99 females; Mage = 
18.93, SDage = .99; 77.2% White). The design had two conditions (true-attitude vs. fake-attitude 
expression) that were delivered within participants. The dependent variable was the predominant 
gathering of attitude-consistent vs. –inconsistent information.  
Procedure and Materials 
 After consent and an attention check (preventing participation if failed), participants were 
told the study examined their proficiency at completing tasks to either enable or prevent others 
from knowing their true view on gun control without using their words. Participants were also 
told that their (anonymized) responses during the tasks would be shown to future participants 
(“guessers”) who would try to guess their true view in a future study. First, participants indicated 
their true views on gun control (defined as “the set of laws or policies that regulate the 
manufacture, sale, transfer, possession, modification, or use of firearms by civilians”) via four 
items. One item asked how America should approach gun control laws (1 = very lenient; 8 = very 
restrictive); one item asked whether gun control laws should be made more or less strict (1 = 
much less strict; 8 = much more strict); and two items assessed agreement (1 = strongly 
disagree; 8 = strongly agree) to two separate statements: “Armed citizens are the best defense 
against criminals” [r] and “It should be easier for law-abiding citizens to carry concealed 
handguns” [r]. After reverse-scoring, higher average scores indicated stronger pro-gun control 
attitude (M = 5.60, SD = 1.55; α = .80). 
 Next, participants were told that they would engage in behaviors that would be more or 
less relevant to either misleading or not misleading the future “guessers” on the participants’ 
views toward gun control. Participants were told they could decide whether a particular task 
would be relevant to misleading or not misleading guessers about their attitudes. In that context, 
participants were told that one behavior future guessers would see is how they select information 
on gun control from an information buffet. Participants were shown eight speech titles on a 
single page that were either clearly pro-gun control (four titles) or anti-gun control (four titles). 
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the true-attitude condition, participants were instructed to select the titles as if they wanted others 
to correctly guess their true view on gun control; in the fake-attitude condition, participants were 
instructed to select the titles as if they wanted others to incorrectly guess their true view on gun 
control. Thus, each participant completed the title-selection task twice—once following the true-
attitude condition instructions and once following the fake-attitude condition instructions. The 
order of the task instructions was randomized across participants. Also, in both conditions, a 
comprehension check was placed between task instructions and the title-selection task to ensure 
participants understood the instructions. Specifically, on a separate page immediately after 
reading the task instructions in each condition, participants completed a comprehension check 
that presented a multiple-choice list of six different task instructions, and participants were 
instructed to identify which task instructions they had read on the previous page. Only one 
answer choice included the correct instructions: in the true-attitude condition, the correct answer 
described the instructions as ‘To select information in a way that would make others correctly 
guess my true view on gun control’; in the fake-attitude condition, the correct answer described 
the instructions as ‘To select information in a way that would make others incorrectly guess my 
true view on gun control’. Participants could not complete the title-selection task until they 
identified the correct task instructions in each condition.   
Within each condition, we measured the number of pro- and anti-gun control titles 
selected; to index participants’ information-selection bias for each condition (our dependent 
variables), we subtracted the number of selected anti-gun control titles from the number of 
selected pro-gun control titles (positive difference scores indicated pro-gun-control information-
selection bias; see Table 1 for descriptives). Relations between these difference scores and 
participants’ self-reported true attitude indexed selective-exposure bias (i.e., positive relations 
indicated congenial information selection; negative relations indicated uncongenial information 
selection). After the title-selection tasks, the study abruptly ended, and participants reported 
demographics and were debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
 We suspected that participants in the true-attitude condition would select more congenial 
information, but participants in the fake-attitude condition would select more uncongenial 
information. Consistent with this possibility, the relation between true views (higher scores 
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anti-) gun control information was large and positive in the true-attitude condition (r = .65, p < 
.001) but large and negative in the fake-attitude condition (r = -.59, p < .001). Indeed, a 2 (reveal 
condition: true attitude vs. fake attitude; within-subjects) × true view (continuous) regression 
analysis revealed that these two discrepant correlations significantly differed from each 
other, F(1, 112) = 76.53, p < .001; η2 = .41 (see Figure 1). In sum, participants engaged in 
uncongenial information selection when they wanted to fake their true views but engaged in 
congenial information selection when they wanted to reveal their true views to others. This 
evidence supports the possibility that people conceptualize information display as a form of 
attitude expression and can modulate selection in an appropriate way to convey attitudes. The 
present experiment has weaknesses that could limit conclusions. For example, because 
participants were presented with information search as an option to convey their views, it 
remains unclear whether people would choose this means naturally. Nonetheless, because 
participants were told (falsely) that they would be given multiple methods to express their view 
that can range in efficacy, people’s use of information selection to convey their views is unlikely 
a mere artifact of demand or feeling constrained to only this method.       
 Our theory predicts that people should anticipate greater discomfort displaying 
uncongenial (vs. congenial) information in public, even if they never process the information. 
Presumably, the thought of uncongenial vs. congenial information display should arouse an 
admixture of negative cognitive (e.g., “I am being inauthentic.”) and affective experiences (e.g., 
shame, embarrassment, humiliation) consistent with making the wrong impression on others. 
Experiment 2 tested this idea. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, participants indicated their view on a divisive topic of their choice that 
they cared about (e.g., abortion, religion, and gun control were popular choices). They then read 
two vignettes depicting a situation in which they publicly displayed (but did not process/read) a 
book conspicuously containing either congenial or uncongenial information with their views on 
the divisive topic. After reading each vignette, participants rated their anticipated feelings of 
identity inauthenticity and socially-relevant emotions. We also assessed participants’ relative 
aversion to uncongenial (vs. congenial) information as a function of whether consumption of 
information was public (i.e., on display) or private (i.e., not on display). Specifically, participants 
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congenial book from the internet (no display) vs. from a store clerk (display); (b) the extent to 
which they would feel pride not displaying vs. displaying an uncongenial and congenial book; 
and (c) their willingness to read uncongenial and congenial information in private (no display) 
vs. public (display).    
We hypothesized that participants would anticipate merely displaying (without 
reading/processing) uncongenial information would make them feel more inauthentic and more 
negative affect than displaying congenial information in public. We speculated further that 
participants would anticipate publically purchasing, owning, or reading books on controversial 
topics would be less pleasant than doing these behaviors in private (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1973), 
but, critically, we anticipated this effect would be strengthened in the context of uncongenial (vs. 
congenial) information.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
We began running this experiment during the last week of a semester and allowed data to 
collect until the semester ended. This yielded participation from 348 US college students, which 
surpassed the sample size of N = 199 required to detect a small two-tailed effect (Cohen’s d = 
.20; partial η2 = .01) with power set to .80 and alpha .05. Participants completed this online study 
in exchange for course credit. Five participants failed to complete the study, leaving 343 
participants for data analysis (Mage = 18.67, SDage = 0.92; 252 female). The study included 
multiple dependent variables and analyses, which were of a 2 (social context: private vs. public) 
× 2 (information type: congenial vs. uncongenial information) repeated-measures form. 
Procedure and Measures 
After consenting and reviewing study instructions, participants were asked to consider 
any controversial topic on which they hold a strong position. Participants indicated (a) their 
selected topic, (b) their position on said topic, (c) the extent to which people they care about 
share their position (M = 6.99, SD = 2.32; 1 = “They do not at all share my position.”; 10 = 
“They completely share my position.”), (d) the extent to which their view is important to them 
(M = 8.36, SD = 1.84; 1 = “My view is not at all important to me.”; 10 = “My view is extremely 
important to me.”), and (e) the extent to which their view (position) is central to their identity (M 
= 6.05, SD = 2.53; 1 = “My view is not at all central to my identity.”; 10 = “My view is extremely 
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instruction to list a cherished belief. Cherished positions on controversial topics should have 
greater concordance within one’s social circle, be perceived as important, and be considered 
central to one’s identity. Three one-sample t-tests revealed the means on the three items 
statistically varied from the scale midpoint (5.5; tave. = 14.89; pave. < .001). 
Next, we manipulated information type (congenial vs. uncongenial) as a within-subjects 
factor and had participants report responses for each condition. Participants read the following 
vignette stem: 
“Imagine that, for a study, you were asked to sit in a busy public space and display a 
book that very clearly [supported (i.e., validated, confirmed)]/[contradicted (i.e., 
invalidated, disconfirmed)] your view on this issue for all to see. The book is rather well-
known, and the book is rather large and attention-grabbing. You don’t read the book; 
you just keep the book in your lap. Imagine a lot of people are noticing you and can 
certainly see your choice of reading material. Try to vividly picture where you are sitting 
and all the people passing by and noticing you.” 
In the congenial-information condition, participants read about displaying a book that supported 
their view. In the uncongenial-information condition, participants read about displaying a book 
that contradicted their view. Following each condition, participants rated on 10-point scales (1 = 
not at all; 10 = extremely) their negative affect (15 items; e.g., embarrassed, anxious, proud [r], 
contented [r]) and perceptions of identity inauthenticity (four items; e.g., misrepresenting 
oneself, presenting one’s authentic self [r]). For each condition, we collapsed items into their 
respective indices of negative affect (αcongenial = .91; αuncongenial = .91) and identity inauthenticity 
(αcongenial = .85; αuncongenial = .89).  
Next, participants indicated (a) their willingness (1 = not at all; 10 = extremely) to read 
congenial and uncongenial information on their cherished belief in private vs. public settings, (b) 
the extent to which they would feel discomfort (1 = not at all; 10 = extremely) purchasing an 
uncongenial and congenial book on their cherished belief from the internet (private) vs. from a 
store clerk (public), and (c) the extent to which they would feel pride (1 = not at all; 10 = 
extremely) to not display vs. display an uncongenial and congenial book on their cherished 
belief. For exploratory purposes, we also assessed the extent to which each participant would feel 
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not have a matched private-comparison scenario and were included for our own curiosity. 
Finally, participants completed demographics and were debriefed. 
Results 
Mere Information Display on Perceived Inauthenticity and Negative Affect 
 We speculated that participants would anticipate merely displaying (but not 
reading/processing) uncongenial (vs. congenial) information in public would make them feel 
more inauthentic and more negative affect. Findings supported both ideas. Paired-samples t-tests 
revealed that participants anticipated feeling (a) more inauthentic in the uncongenial-information 
condition (M = 8.01, SD = 2.32) than in the congenial-information condition (M = 3.24, SD = 
2.12), t(342) = 25.10, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.36 (see Figure 2, Panel A), and (b) more negative 
affect in the uncongenial-information condition (M = 6.26, SD = 1.80) than in the congenial-
information condition (M = 3.48, SD = 1.54), t(342) = 21.28, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.15 (see 
Figure 2, Panel B). Of note, the extent to which participants anticipated feeling relatively 
inauthentic was nearly (statistically) redundant with negative affect, r = .74. Hence, feeling 
inauthentic highly corresponds with feeling negative, which people presumably wish to avoid via 
congenial information display.  
Display (Public) vs. No Display (Private) Manipulations on Anticipated Affective Reactions 
to Information Gathering and Exposure Willingness 
 Purchasing and owning congenial vs. uncongenial books. We speculated that 
participants would anticipate enhanced discomfort with (a) purchasing uncongenial (vs. 
congenial) books, (b) purchasing books on display (vs. not on display), but that the effect of 
purchasing uncongenial (vs. congenial) books on negative affect would be enhanced when 
display (vs. no display) of the information was relevant. We submitted discomfort to a 2 (social 
context: display vs. no display) × 2 (information type: congenial vs. uncongenial information) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of social context, F(1, 342) = 
97.15, p < .001, partial η2 = .22, showing discomfort ratings were higher in the display (vs. no 
display) condition, and a main effect of information type, F(1, 342) = 57.08, p < .001, partial η2 
= .14, showing discomfort ratings were higher in the uncongenial-information (vs. congenial-
information) condition. But, as anticipated, these main effects were qualified by the significant 
interaction, F(1, 342) = 29.41, p < .001, partial η2 = .08, (see Figure 3, Panel A). We examined 
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discomfort ratings in the uncongenial-information (vs. congenial-information) condition was 
larger in the display (M = -1.74, SD = 3.91) than no-display condition (M = -0.71, SD = 3.03). 
We also examined simple effects of social context on discomfort at each level of information 
type. As expected, discomfort ratings in the uncongenial-information condition were higher in 
the display (M = 4.97, SD = 2.87) than the no-display condition (M = 3.27, SD = 2.72); the same 
pattern was observed in the congenial-information condition (for display: M = 3.22, SD = 2.90; 
for no-display: M = 2.56, SD = 2.75), but the difference between the means was smaller. Put 
plainly, people anticipated that buying information in public would be more unpleasant than 
buying the same information in private (i.e., online), but this effect of social context on 
discomfort was magnified for uncongenial versus congenial information.  
 We speculated that participants would anticipate more pride with owning books 
containing congenial (vs. uncongenial) information, but such an effect would be more 
pronounced when book ownership was on display (vs. not on display). We submitted pride to a 2 
(social context: display vs. no display) × 2 (information type: congenial vs. uncongenial 
information) repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of social context, 
F(1, 342) = 8.98, p < .001, partial η2 = .03, suggesting greater pride in the no-display (vs. 
display) condition, and a main effect of information type, F(1, 342) = 631.72, p < .001, partial η2 
= .65, suggesting greater pride in the congenial-information (vs. uncongenial-information) 
condition. These main effects were qualified by the significant interaction, F(1, 342) = 28.89, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .08 (see Figure 3, Panel B). As anticipated, pride ratings from owning a 
congenial (vs. uncongenial) book were greater in the display (M = 4.62, SD = 3.41) than the no-
display condition (M = 3.68, SD = 3.51). We also examined simple effects of social context on 
pride at each level of information type. As expected, pride ratings in the uncongenial-information 
condition were lower in the display (M = 2.76, SD = 2.17) than no-display condition (M = 3.51, 
SD = 2.37); the pattern reversed in the congenial-information condition (for display: M = 7.38, 
SD = 2.48; for no display: M = 7.19, SD = 2.56).3 
 Willingness to select information. We speculated that participants would indicate 
greater willingness to read information not on display or private (vs. on display or public), 
                                                            
3 The simple effect of social context on pride in the congenial-information condition seems inconsistent with the 
simple effect of social context on discomfort in the congenial-information condition. Indeed, the discrepancy was 
not anticipated, so it could be statistical noise. Or, it could suggest that participants might feel conflicted about 
advertising their true positions publically. For example, value affirmations can create a sense of pride but might 
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greater willingness to read congenial (vs. uncongenial) information, but that this enhanced 
willingness to read congenial information would increase when reading is on display or public 
(vs. not on display or private). We submitted willingness to a 2 (information type: congenial vs. 
uncongenial information) × 2 (social context: display vs. no display) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of information type, F(1, 342) = 290.95, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .46, suggesting heightened willingness in the congenial-information (vs. 
uncongenial-information) condition, and a main effect of social context, F(1, 342) = 122.73, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .26, suggesting heightened willingness in the no-display (vs. display) condition. 
These main effects were qualified by the significant interaction, F(1, 342) = 84.06, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .20 (see Figure 3, Panel C). As anticipated, the enhanced willingness to read 
congenial (vs. uncongenial) information was greater in the display (M = 2.96, SD = 3.01) than 
the no-display condition (M = 1.76, SD = 2.64). We also examined simple effects of social 
context at each level of information type. As expected, willingness to read uncongenial 
information was lower in the display (M = 4.82, SD = 2.65) than the no-display condition (M = 
6.53, SD = 2.60); the pattern was directionally similar in the congenial-information condition, 
but the means were closer (for display: M = 7.19, SD = 2.56; for no display: M = 7.38, SD = 
2.48).  
Discussion 
 Participants imagined that merely displaying uncongenial (vs. congenial) information 
would make them feel less authentic and arouse more negative affect. The effects of the display 
vs. no-display manipulations on information exposure variables provided additional support for 
our ideas. Participants anticipated more discomfort and less pride associated with owning or 
purchasing uncongenial (vs. congenial) information, but these effects were accentuated when the 
purchase or ownership was on display (vs. private). And, participants indicated a greater bias 
toward reading congenial (vs. uncongenial) information, but this bias was accentuated when 
reading was in public (vs. private) and, therefore, on display. Notably, participants would rather 
read uncongenial information than also display it. In sum, Experiment 2 suggested that people 
are mightily more uncomfortable with displaying uncongenial vs. congenial information on 
controversial issues, which suggests why they are prone to congenial selective exposure. Extant 
notions of selective exposure are unable to account for these findings because such theories fail 
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 Also, we obtained main effects of private vs. public display context on discomfort, pride, 
and exposure willingness. Generally, the effects suggested that participants would feel less 
comfortable with purchasing, owning, or reading information on controversial issues, whether 
congenial or uncongenial, in public. Presumably, people perceive their information choices as 
communicating a controversial stance that can influence how they are perceived and treated by 
others. Indeed, when controversial issues are at stake, people view attitudinal ambivalence as 
socially desirable presumably because ambivalence is easy to defend, suggests one is open-
minded, and is less likely to arouse conflict from rivals (Cialdini et al., 1973; Pillaud et al., 
2013).  
 Experiment 3 was designed to advance Experiment 2 in a key way and provide further 
conceptual support for our idea. Experiment 3 sought to compare the effect of congenial vs. 
uncongenial display (without processing) on anticipated information selection and affect against 
the effect of congenial vs. uncongenial processing (without display) on these variables. Indeed, 
people might anticipate similar selective-exposure tendencies from displaying (without 
processing) congenial (vs. uncongenial) information in public as processing (without displaying) 
congenial (vs. uncongenial) information in private. Such a finding would help highlight how a 
focus on mere processing considerations as a cause of selective-exposure bias tendencies would 
be profoundly incomplete.    
Experiment 3 
 Participants simulated scenarios depicting exposure to either congenial or uncongenial 
information in (a) private settings that involved processing but not displaying the information 
(processing-only condition) and (b) public settings that involved displaying but not processing 
the information (display-only condition). Participants indicated whether they would prefer 
experiencing the processing-only or display-only version of the congenial- and uncongenial-
information scenarios, and they reported their anticipated affect in each scenario. We speculated 
participants would (a) indicate a preference for the processing-only setting that would be larger 
in the context of uncongenial information, (b) anticipate that processing congenial information 
would induce more positive affect than processing uncongenial information, and (c) anticipate 
that displaying congenial information would induce more positive affect than displaying 
uncongenial information. All these hypotheses would conceptually replicate the findings of 
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these latter two hypothesized effects. The anticipated relative hedonic benefit associated with 
processing congenial (vs. uncongenial) information is widely studied and discussed in the 
context of information search; however, the anticipated relative hedonic benefit associated with 
merely displaying congenial (vs. uncongenial) information has not been discussed until now and 
may be just as large in size.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
 A power analysis for detecting a small effect (partial η2 = .01) with power set to .80 and 
alpha at .05 suggested recruiting N = 199 participants. This experiment was completed as part of 
a two-study session where participants always first completed a study about political attitudes in 
which we needed at least N = 365 for adequate power analyses for that study. To that end, 412 
US participants were recruited on MTurk in exchange for $.60; four participants failed to 
complete the study and were removed from analyses (N = 408; 231 females; Mage = 37.93, SDage 
= 13.10; 72.3% White). The experiment was a 2 (social context: display-only vs. processing-
only) × 2 (information type: congenial vs. uncongenial information) repeated measures design. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants indicated a controversial topic on which they held a strong position and their 
view on said topic. Next, they used a 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) scale to rate (a) whether 
people they care about shared their view (M = 7.52, SD = 1.97), (b) their view was important to 
them (M = 8.48, SD = 1.81), and (c) their view was central to their identity (M = 7.13, SD = 
2.47). Participants seemed to select an important topic. The means on each of the three items 
(items a-c) differed from the scale midpoints (tave. = 22.41; pave. < .001).  
 Next, participants responded to four scenarios dealing with either mere display or mere 
processing of either congenial or uncongenial information on their chosen topic. The four 
scenarios, delivered within-subjects, were as follows: display-only congenial, display-only 
uncongenial, processing-only congenial, and processing-only uncongenial. The display-only 
scenario described the participant sitting in a busy public place for 20 minutes clearly displaying 
a well-known, easily-identified, attention-grabbing book that was either congenial or 
uncongenial with their view on their chosen topic; the processing-only scenario described the 
participant sitting in private for 20 minutes reading a book containing strong arguments that were 
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presented to participants in two separate, randomized pairs according to information type. That 
is, participants read the display-only-congenial scenario paired with the processing-only-
congenial scenario and the display-only-uncongenial scenario paired with the processing-only-
uncongenial scenario. We paired the scenarios this way to assess participants’ preference for 
display-only (vs. processing-only) as a function of whether the information was congenial and 
uncongenial. Thus, within each pair of congenial- and uncongenial-information scenarios, 
participants first selected whether they would prefer experiencing the display-only or processing-
only version of the scenario (for congenial information: 280 [69%] participants preferred 
processing-only; for uncongenial information: 323 [79%] participants preferred processing-
only), and then they used three bipolar scales (-5 = [bad]/[unpleasant]/[negative]; +5 = 
[good]/[pleasant]/[positive]) that we averaged to describe their anticipated affect in each 
scenario (anticipated affect scales within each scenario pairing were randomized; see Table 2 for 
descriptives).4  
Results and Discussion 
Preferences for Display-only vs. Processing-only as a Function of Congenial and 
Uncongenial Information 
To examine participants’ preference for display-only or processing-only social contexts 
for exposure to congenial and uncongenial information, we submitted participants’ scenario 
preference selections to two chi-square tests (one test for congenial information; one test for 
uncongenial information). Consistent with our hypothesis, both chi-square tests revealed that 
participants preferred processing-only to display-only contexts for both congenial and 
uncongenial information, χ2congenial = 56.63, p < .001; χ2uncongenial = 138.83, p < .001. We also 
examined whether this preference was greater for uncongenial (vs. congenial) information using 
a Wilcoxon sign test. As anticipated, this test revealed participants preferred processing-only 
contexts significantly more for uncongenial (vs. congenial) information, Z = -3.79, p < .001. 
Thus, participants preferred to process than display both types of information, but this preference 
was stronger for uncongenial (vs. congenial) information.  
Anticipated Affect in Each Scenario 
                                                            
4 Lastly, for exploratory purposes, participants completed the brief fear of negative evaluation scale (Leary, 1983). 
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We submitted anticipated affect ratings to a 2 (social context: display-only vs. 
processing-only) × 2 (information type: congenial vs. uncongenial information) repeated-
measures ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of information type, F(1, 407) = 288.63, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .42, suggesting participants anticipated more positive affect (i.e., greater 
hedonic benefit) in the congenial- (vs. uncongenial-) information condition. It also revealed a 
main effect of social context, F(1, 407) = 210.38, p < .001, partial η2 = .34, suggesting 
participants anticipated more positive affect in private (vs. public). The interaction was null, p = 
.886, meaning the anticipated affect associated with processing congenial (vs. uncongenial) 
information (M = 2.52, SD = 3.29) was approximately similar in magnitude to the anticipated 
affect associated with merely displaying congenial (vs. uncongenial) information (M = 2.50, SD 
= 3.60; see Figure 4).  
 In sum, Experiment 3 revealed that: (1) participants preferred private processing (vs. 
public display) contexts for information exposure but were less averse to public display if the 
information was congenial, and (2) participants anticipated that merely displaying congenial (vs. 
uncongenial) information would result in enhanced hedonic benefit commensurate to merely 
processing congenial (vs. uncongenial) information. Selective exposure theorists have 
reasonably assumed that information-exposure choices originate from hedonic motivation (i.e., 
to feel good vs. bad; Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009) but have focused their analysis on hedonic 
implications of information processing and neglected hedonic implications of information 
display. Given these data, these theoretical approaches seem profoundly incomplete. 
 Nonetheless, none of the findings so far necessarily support our idea that display 
concerns are an impetus for selective-exposure behavior in daily life. Indeed, we would argue 
that people often turn to selective exposure to intentionally convey their views on important 
issues via display (e.g., people watch Fox News [CNN] to signal their conservatism [liberalism] 
to audiences). Hence, as people show greater endorsement of the belief that selective exposure 
on a topic facilitates authentic identity-conveyance, they should intend higher levels of selective 
exposure on the topic in daily life. Experiment 4 examined this prediction.     
Experiment 4 
 Participants in Experiment 4 indicated the extent to which reading congenial and 
uncongenial information on a cherished topic would allow them to signal their true view on the 
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information on the topic in daily life. There are of course pros and cons of assessing behavioral 
intentions rather than using, for example, in-lab behavioral measures. Although in-lab behavioral 
measures may be less open to response biases than self-reported intentions, in-lab behavioral 
measures can be of questionable external validity. Behavioral intentions, however, ask about 
intended real-world behavior and are more inclusive than a single behavior assessment in the lab. 
Moreover, behavioral intentions are often very good indicators of actual behavior (Ajzen, 1985; 
Glasman & Albarracín, 2006; Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). For these reasons, we 
wished to study behavioral intentions.  
 We predicted participants would indicate greater intent to select congenial (vs. 
uncongenial) information and rate the congenial (vs. uncongenial) information as more effective 
to signal their true view to others. Finally, we predicted that participants’ intention to select more 
congenial (vs. uncongenial) information (i.e., selective-exposure intent) would correlate 
positively with their belief that congenial (vs. uncongenial) information more effectively conveys 
their true view to others. For breadth, participants also rated the extent to which reading 
congenial and uncongenial information on the topic would strengthen/weaken their view and be 
informative. 
Method 
Participants and Design  
  Based on the results of Experiments 1-3, we anticipated moderate-to-l rge effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d > .50) for analyses of intent to select congenial (vs. uncongenial) information and 
rate congenial (vs. uncongenial) information as more effective in identity conveyance, but, we 
anticipated a more modest effect (r = .21; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003) when testing 
the relation between these two indices. Thus, to be conservative in our sample size estimation 
and ensure adequate power across all analyses, we based our power analysis on the smaller effect 
(r = .21; one-tailed) with power set to .80 and alpha to .05, which suggested collecting 136 
participants. We oversampled to account for possible participant attrition and data exclusions and 
collected data from 172 undergraduate students from the US who participated for partial 
fulfillment of course requirements. One participant failed to complete the study and was removed 
from analyses (N = 171; 151 females; Mage = 19.19, SDage = 2.60; 77.2% White). The experiment 
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Procedure and Materials 
 Similar to Experiments 2-3, after consent and an attention check (preventing participation 
if failed), participants identified a controversial topic on which they held a strong position and 
wrote a brief explanation of their view on the topic. Participants then indicated their likelihood (-
5 = not likely at all; +5 = extremely likely) of reading in daily life (a) information that was 
congenial with their view on the topic (one item; M = 1.57, SD = 2.46) and (b) information that 
was uncongenial with their view on the topic (one item; M = -.41, SD = 2.78). By subtracting the 
latter rating from the former rating, we derived a selective-exposure-intent score (numbers 
greater than 0 indicate an intent to engage in selective exposure). Next, participants responded to 
items assessing the extent to which: (1) reading congenial [uncongenial] information would 
weaken/strengthen their views on the topic (-5 = weaken; +5 = strengthen; one item each; 
Mcongenial = 2.94, SDcongenial = 1.80; Muncongenial = .80, SDuncongenial = 2.23), (2) reading congenial 
[uncongenial] information would be informative on the topic (-5 = not at all informative; +5 = 
extremely informative; one item each; Mcongenial = 2.78, SDcongenial = 1.89; Muncongenial = .95, 
SDuncongenial = 2.82), and (3) reading congenial [uncongenial] information in public would convey 
their views/identity (three items per the two information types; Mcongenial = 2.85, SDcongenial = 
1.90; αcongenial = .90; Muncongenial = -1.38, SDuncongenial = 2.42; αuncongenial = .90) . These six 
“identity-conveyance” items began with the stem “If I am reading material that supports 
[contradicts] my position in public (e.g., at a coffee shop), I think I am:” to which participants 
responded on bipolar scales (-5 = [giving people the wrong idea about my 
beliefs]/[misrepresenting my views]/[supporting a view I do not embrace]; +5 = [giving people 
the right idea about my beliefs]/[accurately representing my views]/[supporting a view I do 
embrace]; answering “0” would mean public information exposure conveys nothing about 
identity). Finally, participants answered demographics and were debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Main Analyses 
Selective-exposure intent (M = 1.98, SD = 3.19) was higher than the midpoint of zero, 
t(170) = 8.14, p <.001, Cohen’s d = 0.62, suggesting participants intended to collect  more 
congenial (vs. uncongenial; see Figure 5) information. As anticipated, participants rated 
congenial (vs. uncongenial) information as higher in identity conveyance (M = 4.22, SD = 3.56; 
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advantage given to congenial information on identity conveyance would relate to selective-
exposure intent. Indeed, the correlation between selective-exposure intent and the relative 
advantage given to congenial information on identity conveyance was positive (r = .27, p < 
.001). 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Participants also rated congenial (vs. uncongenial) information as higher in view-
strengthening (M = 2.15, SD = 2.64; t[170] = 10.64, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.81; see Figure 7) 
and informativeness (M = 1.83, SD = 3.17; t[170] = 7.56, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.58; see Figure 
8). The relative advantage given to congenial information on these beliefs related positively and 
about moderately to selective-exposure intent (view-strengthening: r = .27, p < .001; 
informativeness: r = .34, p < .001).  
Discussion 
 Participants believed that congenial information more effectively conveys their views to 
others than uncongenial information, and the extent of this belief related positively to selective-
exposure intent. Participants also believed that congenial (vs. uncongenial) information would be 
more informative and strengthen their views to a greater extent, and these beliefs also correlated 
positively with selective-exposure intent. Thus, selective-exposure intentions are likely complex 
and logically follow from beliefs about the consequences associated with information processing 
(strengthening vs. weakening views and reaching accurate conclusions) and information display 
(correctly asserting one’s public identity via information-display decisions).    
General Discussion 
To summarize, in Experiment 1, participants used selective exposure to express or 
conceal their views, suggesting people perceive selective exposure as a method for attitude 
expression. In Experiment 2, although participants indicated a preference for processing rather 
than displaying information, participants indicated that displaying (without processing) congenial 
(vs. uncongenial) information would enhance feelings of authenticity and reduce negative affect. 
These participants also anticipated more discomfort purchasing an uncongenial than congenial 
book in public than in private, more pride owning a congenial than uncongenial book on public 
display than kept in private, and greater avoidance of uncongenial information when the 
exposure is on display. Likewise, in Experiment 3, participants showed enhanced preferences for 
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congenial than uncongenial information. These participants also anticipated that merely 
displaying congenial (vs. uncongenial) information would create hedonic benefit commensurate 
to processing congenial (vs. uncongenial) information. In Experiment 4, participants indicated 
that displaying congenial (vs. uncongenial) information more accurately conveyed their identity 
to an audience, and this belief related to selective-exposure intentions in their daily lives. This set 
of findings supports the possibility that the selection of congenial and uncongenial information 
can reflect people’s considerations about information display.   
Extant selective exposure theories fail to acknowledge the role of information display 
(Festinger, 1957; Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2008; Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 
2005; Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; Mastro et al., 2002), which makes these theories incomplete. 
These theories stress that people consider the processing implications of information gathering, 
which implicate people’s presumptions about information consumption. For example, people 
gather more congenial information on the grounds that processing it will feel better and be more 
informative. There is no reason to challenge these processes, but, in daily life, selective exposure 
should also be conceptualized as a form of consumption that revolves around information 
display. When in public, people wish to display information that correctly vs. incorrectly 
identifies the self to others, so they assemble more congenial than uncongenial information to 
suit this wish. People are reluctant to display information on controversial issues in public, but 
displaying uncongenial information is exceptionally aversive because it sends the wrong 
message about one’s identity and can provoke greater negative affect relative to congenial 
information.   
The present findings are likely reflective of broader principles of self-presentation that 
apparently dictate most forms of human behavior (Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 
1980, 2012). As social animals, people’s outcomes are largely dictated by their social reputations 
(e.g., one cannot be considered incompetent to get a job); hence, people seek to strategically 
modify their social reputations via use of symbolic gestures to win desired treatment (e.g., via 
behavior, material possessions). For example, Hardy and Van Vugt (2006) provided evidence 
that people might behave “altruistically” for the reputational benefits (e.g., seeming powerful) 
associated with the implications of this behavior. Likewise, Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den 
Bergh (2010) provided evidence that people se ct “green” products over less expensive and 
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humanity and are therefore powerful people. The present findings can be broadly construed in 
this vein and suggest that certain acts of selective exposure can also be designed for a self-
presentational benefit (e.g., to convey a desired identity or connect with an in-group). Moreover, 
because information display on controversial topics might be generally perceived as costly (e.g., 
information displays can invite conflict from dissenters), people might sometimes use congenial 
information display to highlight their own formidability and fearlessness to their in-group 
(Fessler et al., 2015), which can make such individuals seem highly valuable to the in-group. 
Such ideas deserve future examination.          
The present ideas suggest a need to more critically analyze the effects of moderators on 
selective exposure. As a few examples, selective exposure is amplified when individuals (a) are 
highly committed to an attitude or behavior (Jonas & Frey, 2003); (b) are dealing with 
information relevant to enduring, personally-defining values (McFarland & Warren, 1992); (c) 
are reminded of their mortality (Jonas, Greenberg, & Frey, 2003); and (d) do not feel self-
affirmed (Klein & Harris, 2009) or are placed in a negative mood (Jonas, Graupmann, & Frey, 
2006). All of these effects have been understood in conventional selective-exposure terms: 
People prefer congenial information when processing uncongenial information would be 
particularly likely to sting and congenial information would seem particularly satisfying. But, all 
these effects can also reflect changes to concerns about information display, too. For example, 
people who are selecting information based on important values should be oriented toward 
displaying these views with predominantly congenial information choices, particularly when not 
self-affirmed. Hence, moderators of selective exposure might work on distinct processes that can 
influence selective exposure.      
Although the present set of experiments possesses strengths such as using varied 
manipulations and measures and relatively large sample sizes, they also possess limitations that 
can be addressed in future work. The present studies were limited to self-reports often assessed 
in the context of simulated situations in which the participant would know the topic under 
investigation (albeit not the researchers’ hypotheses) and therefore could manipulate their 
responses to make a desired impression. Hence, future research that uses surreptitious methods to 
test our theory, or includes conditions under which responding is incentive-compatible, are 
needed. Moreover, future research should examine the full scope of this selective exposure 
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public information-gathering behavior. Indeed, the notion of self-signaling implies that people 
will engage in behavior that is a signal (merely to the self) of a desired state (Bodner & Prelec, 
2002). Specifically, to the extent people wish to impress an internal audience, they might 
consider how their behavior reflects on desired images in private settings (Schlenker, 2012). For 
example, a devout Republican might feel uneasy about watching CNN (a news network with a 
generally liberal bent), even if no one will ever know, because the person feels as if s/he is “not 
acting like a Republican” or is otherwise misrepresenting oneself (to oneself). This can arouse 
self-conscious feelings of guilt or shame conceptually distinct from other concerns a Republican 
might have about privately processing information from CNN (e.g., concerns that CNN is biased 
or presents arguments that provoke anger). Hence, display considerations may be present in 
private information-selection settings, albeit the concerns are likely attenuated because an 
external audience is not present to judge the person. Also, numerous ideas for future work arise 
from considering the apparently complex interplay between audience characteristics (e.g., 
audience views), the selector’s self-presentation goals, and the social meaning of information 
gathering. As one example, in much the same way people change their views to appear more 
similar to an important audience (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Pittman, 1982), we imagine 
information selectors might gather information to imply more similarity to an important audience 
(that is otherwise ignorant of their stance). Hence, if a gun control advocate is publically 
gathering information and perceives his/her audience, which s/he hopes to impress, as anti-gun 
control, s/he will temper his/her search for pro-gun control information as an ingratiation 
technique. As another example, people might engage in information gathering to express 
identities that are not directly tied to their particular views on issues. For example, if Carl knows 
Alex is aware of his stance on gun control, Carl may selectively display information on gun 
control in Alex’s presence to appear “curious and open” (by displaying more uncongenial 
information), “unbiased and systematic” (by displaying even-handedness), or “committed and 
resolute” (by displaying more congenial information) to Alex. Presumably, Carl’s approach to 
information gathering will be dictated by his evaluation of these different identities and, if he 
wishes to impress Alex, his perception of how Alex might evaluate these identities (e.g., would 
Alex like someone that is curious, even-handed, or resolute?). Our analysis offers numerous 
interesting and novel ideas for studying how people gather congenial information, which we 
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 Selective-exposure bias has been researched for decades, and hundreds of studies have 
examined selective-exposure effects (Hart et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the underlying causes of 
and functions for selective-exposure bias are still being formulated. Here, we provided evidence 
that selective-exposure bias is not merely about reading/processing preferences but also reflects a 
way to self-present one’s authentic views to audiences. This novel position suggests a potentially 
promising approach to understanding and influencing selective exposure. 
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Figure 1. Information-selection bias as a function of true gun control view and reveal condition 
(true attitude vs. fake attitude). Positive information-selection bias scores indicate pro-gun 




 M SD M SD 
Pro-GC Titles Selected 1.31 1.30 .89 1.25 
Anti-GC Titles Selected .92 1.28 1.50 1.46 
Pro-GC Bias (Difference Score) .39 2.26 -.61 2.44 
Note. GC = gun control. Positive difference scores indicate pro-gun-control 
information-selection bias. Maximum possible difference score is +/- 4. 
  
Table 2 
Descriptives for Anticipat d Affect for Each Scenario in Experiment 3 
 Congenial Information Uncongenial Information 
 M SD α M SD α 
Display-only .86 2.78 .97 -1.65 2.83 .98 
Processing-only 2.67 2.05 .96 .15 2.60 .96 















YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ   30 
 




































YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ   31 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 























Figure 3. The 
interactive effect of 
information type and 
social context on 
discomfort with 
purchasing a book 
(Panel A), pride with 
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Figure 7. Perceived view-strengthening or weakening as a function of information type. Scores 





















Figure 8. Perceived informativeness as a function of information type. 
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